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Insurgency in Peru,
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Executive Summary

Title: Insurgency in Peru, Retrospective analysis of the Sendero Luminoso's (Shining Path)

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Thesis: Sendero Luminoso (Shinning Path) movement in Peru clearly demonstrates that the motivations and techniques used by the radical Islamic are not new. It proves that insurgencies are fought on a regional level as defined by indigenous populations according to their ways, means and ends.

Discussion Radical Islamist's desire to establish a world dominant Caliphate is an age old concept that has merely taken on a new form. In many ways it models the international Communist movement of the 20th century. Both movements promote an ideology that proves to provide leadership and motivation on a global scale. Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) movement in Peru clearly demonstrates that the motivations and techniques used by the radical Islamic are not new. It proves that insurgencies are fought on a regional level as defined by indigenous populations according to their ways means and ends. The Sendero Luminoso movement adopted its philosophy from Marx, Lenin and Mao. It then tailored it philosophy to fit the condition present in Peru and called Gonzalo thought or the Fourth Sword of Communism. The Sendero Luminoso is known as one the most successful revolutions in Latin America. It saw much success throughout the early 1980's and suddenly 1988 it began to decline and by 1992 it had virtually disappeared. There are many reasons why Sendero failed in Peru. Most importantly the government learned how to fight a counterinsurgency. As time passed, Sendero began to make mistakes internally. It failed politically economically and socially.

Conclusion: Al Qaeda must be defeated at the local level. Wherever an Al Qaeda cell pops up in the world it can be defeated at the local level politically, economically and socially. Each individual insurgency has their one unique traits. There is no cookie cutter solution to counter insurgency. However, examples such as the defeat of the Sendero Luminoso can be used to create a framework on how to conduct count-insurgencies in the future. Insurgencies are protracted wars and many use this idea as their keystone for their ideology. It should be remembered that this idea could be used against them. As the prolonged war continued, Sendero lost its focus, forgets its roots and became impatient with the protracted war, they made many mistakes and they were defeated. In conclusion, the United States should remember that it is the side that provides a better life for the people the world. It is the side that wins the hearts and minds that will prevail against Al Qaeda.

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Introduction

Throughout history, conflict has intrinsically been part of the human condition. The desire for the oppressed to rise up and defeat their oppressors through the means of violence has, and will always exist so long as one man desires what another man has. It has been said that the emergence of international terrorist organization is a new radical concept with a new set of rules that the United States and its allies must adapt in order to maintain its security.¹ The reality is that the Radical Islamist's desires to establish a world dominate Caliphate is an age old concept that has merely taken on a new form. In many ways it models the international Communist movement of the 20th century. Both movements promote an Ideology that proves to provide leadership and motivation on a global scale. Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) movement in Peru clearly demonstrates that the motivations and techniques used by the radical Islamic are not new. It proves that insurgencies are fought on a regional level as defined by indigenous populations according to their ways means and ends.

This paper will discuss the Sendero Luminoso movement in the context of its landscape and history, the emergence of leadership, its ideology, as well as the movement's failures politically, economically and socially. It will also discuss the government had to adapt and learn how to create and effective counterinsurgency. It will conclude with discussion on how the defeat of the Sendero is relevant to Al Qaeda. The United States and its allies can take away many lessons learned in Peru and apply them to assist in the defeat of regionalized Islamic insurgency with an ultimate end state of the defeat of Radical Islam worldwide.

History and Landscape

The Sendero Luminoso is known as one the most successful revolutions in Latin America. It saw success for several reasons. The first reason is that the conditions were ripe for

the rise of a revolutionary movement. The economy was in a state of failure with a growing disparity between economic and ethnic classes. Second, Peru had 500-year history of repressive colonial governments that completely ignored the needs of the conquered indigenous populations. Third, the country had a succession of weak governments that led to a period of political transition leaving Peru vulnerable for the rise of revolution. These circumstances combined with the government's inability to mobilize an effective counter-insurgency, add numerous human rights violations nearly, as well as a forced relocation program that indigenous population out departments considered to be in a state of emergency away from their native lands, further lending the alienation of the rural population. Together, these reasons would lead to the Shinning Paths success throughout the 1980's.

The Sendero Luminoso, more commonly called the radical wing of Communist Party of Peru, first erupted in the Peruvian consciousness on May 17, 1980, when it declared war on the Peruvian state.² For the better part of 12 years the Sendero held the initiative, and for a brief time is seemed as if it were on the verge of accomplishing its goals of taking over power and creating a state of "New Democracy" as its leader Abimael Guzman would call it. Like emerging radical Islamic movements of the 21st century, Sendero Luminoso has traditionally been associated with unparalleled violence. It is founded on a multi-faceted and complex ideology that bears close examination. The complexity of Sendero Luminoso can only be understood by examining the roots from which it sprang.

The roots of Sendero are founded in the idea of an existing Peruvian reality. What was the Peruvian reality, prior to 1980? It was one of a feudalistic society, with an exploitative socioeconomic structure founded in Spanish Colonialism. Though the Spanish crown had been expelled from South America 160 years ago the Spanish colonial structure of *latifundia* still

existed.³ The only difference was instead of a *peninsular* aristocracy exploiting both the *mestizo* and the native indigenous populations of the Quechua Indians; it was now a Creole aristocracy.⁴ Together all South Americans fought for independence from Spain but only a few benefited.

In the 1970s the situation was became worse. It was a Peruvian reality of growing disparity between the rich and the poor. In particular the Andean departments which are home to the indigenous people of the Quecha Indian continued to be isolated and neglected by successive Peruvian administrations. This isolation was a result of rough mountainous terrain of the Andes and the Quecha Indians in ability to create a viable economy. The department of Ayacucho had the highest number of inhabitants without potable water (66.96 percent), electricity (82.86 percent), sewage removal (90.67 percent) and an average of 1 doctor per 3,000 people. Only the neighboring department of Apurimac had a higher literacy rate of 45 percent.⁵ This continued class struggle would be the primary factor to the eventually rise of the communist movement in Peru.

Not only did Peru have continued class stratification but also the country was also politically unstable. From 1968 to 1980 Peru was governed under the military reformist governments of Generals Juan Velasco Alvarado and Francisco Morales Bermudez. The military reformers made sweeping agrarian law reforms, transforming the agrarian structure in the country, finally destroying 500 years of the *latifundia* and redistributing the land.⁶ They attempted to cut Peru's ties to foreign capital by nationalizing foreign industry in the country. These attempts were made to lessen the feudalistic and colonial nature of the nation's socioeconomic system. They ultimately failed. The agricultural cooperatives were unable to support themselves and had to rely heavily on government subsidies. Peru's international borrowing expanded as the nation attempt to industrialize itself. More importantly, the agrarian

reforms were in reality paper tigers. This left a bad taste in the mouth of the people, and brought discredit to the government because of promises made and broken. In the end the military reformers were replaced with a weak civilian government in the reins of Fernando Belaunde Terry. With a fragile economy and in the wake of a political transition period, the conditions were set for revolution. The time was right and all that was needed was an esoteric leader and a people's movement to strike the spark and start the fire.

The Emergence of Revolutionary Leadership

Who was the "Spiritual" leader of the movement? Abimael Guzman was born 3 December 1943 in the port town of Islay, in the department of Arequipa.⁷ He was the illegitimate son of a father with six children by three different women. His mother died when he was five and went to live with his mother's family and later he moved to the city of Arequipa where he lived with his father. While living with his father he attended catholic secondary school and eventually at the age of 19 he became a student at the Social Studies Department of San Augustin National University (SANU).⁸ He was described as shy, disciplined, obsessive and ascetic.⁹ It was during his experience at SANU when he began to follow Marxist theory and the writings of Jose Carlos Mariategui, the founder of the The Peoples Communist Party of Peru (PCP).

In 1962 Guzman became a member of the faculty at the University of San Crisotbal de Huamanga (UNSCH) as a professor of philosophy and social science in the Education Department. The UNSCH was founded by the Spanish in 1677 and was intended to serve as a regional education center. After being shut down for 80 years, the University was reopened in 1959 in response to a need to educate Indian and *mestizo* inhabitants in Ayacucho, with purpose to improve their standard of living.¹⁰ This was irony at its best. The governments attempt to do

good would bring just enough education for the poor become aware of the reality they lived in. UNSCH eventually became the center of cultural life in the department; bring a new cultural awareness to the youth of the Department. The environment of UNSCH combined with a desperately poor region provided an excellent starting point for Maoist-style insurrection.

When Guzman arrived in Ayacucho he was already a member of the PCP. He immediately began teaching and disseminating Communist theory. His deep conviction, charisma and his magnetic personality both in and out of the classroom drew many followers. Not only did he attract students but also he drew in local inhabitants and other faculty members. Guzman eventually managed to get elected to the university's executive council, the body responsible for directing all of UNSCH's institutional policies. He served as the director of the General Studies program, a two-year series of course obligatory for all incoming students to attend.¹¹ By combining his administrative clout and dynamic teaching abilities, Guzman was able to increase his pool of students that identified with Marxist and Maoist doctrine. In 1970 Guzman was appointed Director of Personnel Faculty and Staff and used his position to dismiss his political opponents replacing them with personnel that had beliefs closer to his.¹² Once he gained control of UNSCH, Guzman sent his followers out to begin educating the oppressed Mestizo and Indian populations in Ayacucho, Apurimac and Huancavlic.

When Guzman's students graduated many of them would return to their native villages to pass on Guzman's version of Maoist teachings. This was done verbally due to the very low literacy rate in the Andean regions of Peru. The verbal tradition of passing information and doctrine would be a hallmark of the Sendero Luminoso movement. It was done so well that Guzman's Maoist ideology would be called the fourth sword of communism and for many of followers it would become a theology. The verbal tradition made it very difficult for the Peruvian

government and military to understand how the organization was structured, how it operated and who its leaders were.

Revolutionary Ideology

Sendero Luminoso was founded on Lenin, Marx and Maoist ideology and was organized in such a way that provided cohesion and discipline. It also provided a sense of identity, belonging and purpose which was very attractive to many people in the Andean regions of Peru and also in the cities as the movement began to move out of the rural departments in the early 1990.¹³ It has been said, "For certain people, Sendero is like a drug. It helps you get through life without the complications of having to on your own."¹⁴ Though the ideology of the Sendero Luminoso was rooted in Lenin, Marx and Mao it was also rooted in the writings of Jose Carlos Mariategui, which emphasized the necessity to fuel a sense of nationalism with the Peruvian populace, particularly those of Mestizo and Indian blood. Jose Carlos Mariategui was the founder of the Peruvian Communist Party. His essay published in the 1920s, "Seven Interpretative Essays on Peruvian Reality" greatly influenced Guzman's thought. Mariategui's essay drew on a desire to revive the idea of the glory of the Inca Empire before its conquest by Spain. Mariategui depicts the Incas as a glowing portrait of an ideal society that was primarily agrarian and prospered. He dismissed criticisms of the Inca state as despotic and argued that it was Inca communism. In his eye, the Incas had functional socioeconomic system based on the ayllu, which was a type of family cooperative in which the surrounding villages were divided into family worked nontransferable lots.¹⁵ All townships were federations that shared pastures, woodlands and water. The accomplishments of the Incas attest to a degree of economic and social organization that emphasized a collective nature that was bolstered by the Inca's religion. Guzman would adopt Mariategui's belief of the perfect Inca society, that it was the "ideal" state

that had been interrupted by the Spanish conquest in the fifteenth century.¹⁶ That the Spanish conquest had been catastrophic to Peru, because they brought feudalism and completely devastated the country by destroying as much of its natural resources when the Spanish conquistadors were forced to leave in 1824.

Abimael Guzman turned this philosophy into the working doctrine of the Sendero Luminoso. It was designed specifically for Peru's rural and urban underclasses, the Indians and Mestizos. As the ideology spread Guzman began to assume a semi mythical stature and was to be known through out Peru as "Presidente Gonzalo, the fourth sword of Marxism" and "Lenin, Marx, Mao and Gonzalo"¹⁷. Two concepts that Guzman devoted special attention to can easily be traced to Maoist thought. The first element of their ideology was that the revolution must be born in the countryside by the peasants of Peru. Second, the goal of the revolution was to create a "New Democratic Republic." He believed that with meticulously planned campaigns and highly dedicated and motivated militants Sendero could defeat a larger well-equipped government army.

"We are dedicated to the Guiding Thought of our leadership, the main policy, which is to fight to reach victory with the mission of dying to invent the great Subjective Myth."¹⁸

After the initiation of the revolution in 1980, Guzman went into hiding and was not seen publicly until his capture in 1992. In fact he was thought to be dead. While in hiding, he became more than just an ideological leader; he became the shining light of the movement. Guzman became a demigod to the people of the Sendero Luminoso. He did not appear publicly until 1988 when Guzman asked to be interviewed by the newspaper El Diario to emphasize the Sendero's achievements. Specifically the convening of the party's First Congress. In the interview Guzman states, "this Congress marks a milestone, a victory, in which our Party has

been able to sum up the long road traveled, and has established the three basic elements of party unity: its ideology, which is Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, Gonzalo thought; the program; and the general political line.”¹⁹ By conducting this interview Guzman did two things. First, he established the fact that the party was unified in effort and growing in strength and to build unity with his supporters, especially those that thought he might be dead. The second thing this did was strike fear in the Peruvian government, to let them know that he was alive and well.

He was able to do this because Sendero Luminoso developed a very intricate organization. It was an intellectually based, hierarchical insurgency that operated on three levels: national, regional and local.²⁰ At the national level the Sendero would have annual meetings called the National Congress. During these meetings the National Congress would discuss, evaluate and take a critical look at the insurgency’s basic strategy and progress. The National Congress consisted of Guzman and his Regional leaders. There were six regions, where each leader was responsible for planning, evaluation and execution of all Sendero Luminoso activities in the region. This included both educational and military activity.²¹ Regions would be broken down into zones, sectors and cells. Decision-making was centralized to the Regional Leaders. However, execution and planning was decentralized to the lowest level. Key to the success of this organization was that all orders were given orally and did not require written documents. This would make it very difficult for the Peruvian military to track them down.

The United States should pay close attention to the ideas present in Sendero revolutionary ideology, because in many ways it resembles the same thought Al Qaeda promotes today. Both organizations have a very intricate organization and command structure, Because of this structure and that fact that Bin Laden is hiding in the mountains, like Guzman he has been very difficult to track down. They share an all-encompassing worldview. Sendero believe that

Maoism is the natural state of man and Al Qaeda believes that Sharia law is how the world should be governed. Both are ideologically rigid and uncompromising in their worldviews. They seek to control their members' private thought, expression, and behavior.

The portrayal of a charismatic, altruistic leader can be found in both organizations. Guzman portrays himself as pure of thought and as the creator of the subjective myth that created to liberate the oppressed and punish the imperialist. He lives a pure life in the mountains to show his dedication to the cause and uses narratives that portray him as Godly. Osama bin Laden does the same, he depicts himself as a man purified in the mountains of Afghanistan who is gathering and inspiring followers and punishing infidels. Both express a desire to return to the past. Guzman wrote often about retuning Peru to the glory days of the Inca Empire and called for, to a time before Spanish colonialism corrupted society. The Sendero believed that the only way to renew the Inca past was through violent revolution Bin Laden does the same. He depicts himself and his followers as the agents of Islamic history, who will reverse the decline of the Umma and bring about its inevitable triumph over Western imperialism. Al Qaeda believes that they can renew Islam both politically and theologically through jihad, therefore re establishing the Caliphate.

The Five Phases of Gonzalo Thought

Sendero, like Mao had phases of which the revolution was to take part. Instead of three Phases, the Sendero Luminoso used five phases. These phases were not detached or mutually independent, but could occur simultaneously depending on progress in each department of the country. The intent was to make a continuous assault on fronts: psychological, economic, social and militarily.²² Their goals were to be achieved through the use of violence: terrorism,

sabotage, and guerrilla warfare, with the hope of eroding the state gradually. Guzman initially predicted that it would take as long as 50 years to achieve victory.

Phase one was the "Initiation Plan," consisted of agitation and propaganda with the purpose to raise class consciousness and to agitate the population, exacerbating existing class conflicts and calling attention to income inequalities and the corrupt euro centric system.²³ The Sendero Luminoso was very successful at spreading propaganda and getting their message out. This success was largely a result of its ability target both the educated but unemployed masses in the cities through leaflets and publications (i.e. El Dario 1988) and by exploiting the verbal tradition of Incas in Andes by creating slogans that children would recite as if they were nursery rhymes.

They throw clay against our steel
They try to take away your thought
They want to silence your voice they want to murder you
But they will not be able to silence the burning sword of your soul!²⁴

The emphasis of the information disseminated was two pronged. It stressed the inadequacy of the present state, raising class-consciousness and aggravating existing feelings of injustice. The shinning path then emphasizes it, "glowing" plans for the future of a prosperous people's state in which all flourishes "The New Democracy".²⁵

Phase two was the "Deployment Plan," consisting of sabotage and guerrilla action with increased military action, directed against property belonging to the state, large companies and holdings of foreign "imperial nations."²⁶ Their use of sabotage to advance their cause was legendary. It cost Peru millions of dollars in damages and drained funds that could have been used for social development programs that could have helped the poor. Sendero Luminoso's use of sabotage also created an atmosphere of distrust amongst the government, because the high levels of technical expertise and security access required to accomplish many of these attacks

meant that they were inside jobs.²⁷ Sendero's goal was weaken an already crumbling economy, thus leading more people to become frustrated with the difficult living conditions to make the insurgency appear to be the only answer.

Phase three was the "Plan to Conquer Bases," to create generalized violence and guerrilla warfare spreading support for the Shinning Path throughout the country, increasing violence to further shake the existing economic structure. This phase would see the increase of the use of terrorism and guerrilla warfare. From this point on terrorism would be readily used by the Sendero Luminoso. As a result from 1980 to 1988 it has been estimated that 7,700 civilian deaths and in 1989 it had been believed that the total death toll both civilian and military had rose to 15,000 deaths²⁸ (by 2002 this number would double to 30,000).²⁹ Tactics using guerrilla warfare in this phase strictly adhered to the teachings of Mao, with idea of winning the hearts and minds of the people. Later on in both phase four and five Sendero would increasingly target the people, which would eventually work against them. However, based on propaganda leaflets published by the Sendero Luminoso, they had claimed to have had accomplished this phase in 1982, only two years after the initiation of phase one. They largely believed this because the government established emergency military zones in two departments, Ayacucho and Apurimac. Thus demonstrating the movement had spread to other regions of the country.

Phase Four the "Plan to Develop Bases," to conquest and expansion of support bases as more and more people fall under the movements control and are converted into "support bases" to initiate action.³⁰ Sendero Luminoso initially focused their Indoctrination campaign on the south central highland departments of Ayacucho, Apurimac and Huancavlic. Geographically, these departments were located high in the Andes, which isolated them from most major economic centers in Southern Peru. The population of the south central highland departments

consisted mostly of the indigenous Quecha Indians, who were mostly illiterate farmers that were relatively ignored by the State. The geographical, economic and political situation in this region of Peru was conducive to the development of the Sendero and the better life that they offered the Quecha people. From the South central highland the movement grew and spread to the Northern central highlands and beyond, at one time the Sendero would have support bases in as many as 15 of the 24 departments in Peru. The evolutionary ripe environment that existed in the Peruvian highlands coupled with a military that initially saw some success in the counter-insurgency but became frustrated and repressive towards the local populations due to the ruthlessness of the Sendero. Numerous documented human rights violation accrued in all the highland departments, ultimately turning more of the indigenous population against the government.

The Fifth and final phase was the "Great Plan to Develop and Serve the Conquest of Power" to cause fall of the cities and total collapse of the state. Like in Mao's strategy this phase was to strangle successive cities in submission as rural route into cities were cut off and guarded until the urban areas had little choice but to surrender. In 1991 Guzman determined that stage five had been reached, but not achieved.³¹ He then decided to change the strategy to adopt more urban tactics. Rather than cutting off cities the Sendero would attack the cities through terrorist acts and beat the cities into submission. Thus deviating from the Maoist doctrine of which the Sendero was founded on. This change was met by several of his followers with great disapproval. His miscalculation in transitioning to phase five too early, eventually lead to his untimely capture, which plays a key role in the destruction of the Sendero.

The Government Learns Counter-Insurgency

As time passed and "the people's prolonged revolution" continued, the State gradually learned through trial and error. The government acknowledgement a need to increase social,

political, economical programs and they had to improve their counter-insurgency efforts. The Peruvian Army and its intelligence services, though surprisingly slow, began to learn how to "eat soup with a Knife".³² Initially the police had been allocated responsibilities for confronting the guerillas, and the army would only make intermittent incursions into zones when matters appeared to get out of hand. This would occasionally cause a temporary reversal in the countryside.³³ This approach alongside significant the addition of several instances of human rights violations against the peasantry led to a failed counter-insurgency early on.

Needless to say, by late as 1988 the tide had begun to turn toward the government's counter-insurgency.³⁴ It started in the twilight of President Garcia's government as the armed forces began switching from their ham-fisted practices of out-right repression of the country side to a non genocidal authoritarian strategy. This had an immediate effect on rural populations. They began to see the government as non-violent, as an organization that helped provide security in the countryside.

With the election of Alberto Fujimori in the 1991 the re-organization and upgrading of the military, security forces with a special emphasis on the intelligence service culminated in 1992.³⁵ Once change was acknowledged results appeared rapidly virtually by end of 1992 the insurgency had been reduced to almost nothing. On the backdrop of President Alberto Fujimori, autogolpe (palace coup or self coup) in April 1992, a raft of more robust counter-insurgency measures were developed.³⁶ These measures were designed to reverse the prevailing unfavorable balance of force was introduced.

During the first half of 1991 Army leadership finally tempered their natural reticence about arming the rural populations and embarked on a policy of establishing Comites de Civil (Civil Defense Committees-CDCs), more commonly know to local villagers as Comites de

Autodefens or Self Defens Committees.³⁷ When fighting an insurgency it is crucial to both control the people and isolate the insurgents from the people. The developments of the CDCs were crucial to defeating of the Sendero. Unfortunately, it took 11 years the Army finally recognized this. The Army started too send units into the countryside to organize the CDCs and train local populations. Two such units that were very successful at doing this were the 37th Infantry Division which based out Trujillo was sent too the village of La Libertad and the 7th Infantry Battalion based out of the Cajamara was sent to the villages of Cajabamba and San Marcos.³⁸ Priorities were initially given to localities that were deemed to be of strategic importance and those that had a history of intense Sendero activity.

The CDCs might have 30 to 200 members made Males of the ages of fourteen to sixty. The size depended several, the size of the village and of course the activity level of the Sendero in and around the villages. The government provided almost all equipment necessary to cloth and arms the CDCs. Typically; a CDC was armed single shot hunting rifles with a few six shooters here and there. Members were provided with Wellington boots and plastic ponchos. An army adviser that worked in coordination with a local committee directed each CDC. These committees were appointed by the military and comprised of a President, Vice President and individual Committee Chairmen that were individual responsible organizational activities, such as Discipline, record keeping, the economy and quarter mastering. Of course the largest incentive to join the CDC was that presents could take ownership of the own protection and army ensured that conscripts stay in their local village.

The CDC caught on rapidly throughout the countryside. By 1994 there were 955 CDC established in the mountains ranging from the department of Tumbes down to the costal department of Ancash. Collectively they had about 61,000 members that actively participated.

Although the CDC policy target rural Peru, as time passed they would eventually be found running successfully in district capitals.³⁹ Why were they so successful? There are of course several factors for their success. In many cases the populations were already familiar with CDCs because of their past experiences with the Rondas Compasina, which had been a grass roots organization the villages used prior to the beginning of the revolution. Although, the Rondas Compasina of the early 1980's were not sponsored by the government, they were used villages to enforce the rule of law in rural areas. The government thought that the Rondas were the cause of the insurgency. The villages were forced to disband. By 1994, many people were willing to join the CDCs because the Sendero had unwittingly been turning the people against them through their uncontrolled use of violence against villagers.⁴⁰ People in the countryside had, had enough and were willing to take matters of defense into their own hands. With that said, people also joined because they did not want to be labeled by the army as a Sendero sympathizer. Now that the army had become supportive of the people and no longer committed human rights violations, villagers started to turn their noses up at the Sendero. For the first time in the history of the insurgency, people felt that the government could provide them a better future.

Economically the government started to make strides in the counter- insurgency fight. First by neutralizing the Sendero's key tenet of it's the insurgency, the agrarian revolution. The government did this through policies of land distribution that both affected both the cooperative landholder and the independent small landowners. One example of this occurred in June 1990 when the Sociedades Agricolas de Intres Social (SAIS-Agricultural Society of Social Intrests) distributed 2,474 hectares to over 350 individual households in the province of Otuzco.⁴¹ The government also made is practice to had sacks of food through out many departments of the country in attempt to help rural families suffering the prolonged revolution. Land reform was

not the only thing that the government made economic strides in. The government also recognized it was corrupt. The Fujimori presidency was the first to recognize that corruption had created an inefficient government that formed a major source of discontent throughout the country. In response to this, Fujimori removed corrupt judges, and streamlined committees. He encouraged provincial capitals to hold town meetings in order to provide forums for citizen's voice complaints directly to local governments. President Fujimori's reforms only added the public increasing positive view of the government. In conjunction with reform and in an effort to overcome intimidation of judges by the Sendero, Fujimori adopted a faceless judge's policy. Traditionally, the Sendero had been very successful at controlling government officials and judges, thus making it very difficult to prosecute captured Sendero leaders the government.⁴² Protecting the identity from the Sendero, with this protection could incarcerate defendants that were found guilty of aggravated terrorism for multiple life sentences with the prospect of ever being released. This included minors as well, prior to this the Sendero recruited many adolescents into to there ranks knowing that they would not be convicted of crimes and sent to prison due to their young age.

Along with the hood judges policy the government enacted the Repentance Law of 1992, granting amnesty or reduced jail terms for individuals who chose to voluntarily abandon armed struggle and collaborated with authorities by betraying their comrades.⁴³ When the Sendero brought their revolution to the public with their first act of violence in 1980 their high-ranking leadership had joined the movement out of deep political convictions to the movement. As time passed end leaders either were capture or killed the movement began to attract landless urban unemployed men and women with uncertain prospects and many did not have such altruistic motives. They joined looking for adventure, to earn a living or as path to acquire power through

recognition. These careerist follow of the Sendero are the type of revolutionary that were easily attracted to take advantage of the Repentance law, especially as the movement began to lose momentum.

There was one other incident that exacerbated Sendero's growing problem of defectors taking advantage of repentance. The government and military learn the importance of intelligence. In the late 1980's and 90's the government created an intelligence agency and focused a vast amount of resource into ensuring that is the best. In the summer of 1992 Abmiel Guzman after having decided that the revolution transitioned fifth and final phase moved to the city of Lima. Thinking that he could have better command and control as his forces collapsed the city and the government in upon themselves. In September of 1992, to his dismay and the Sendero Luminoso's, Guzman was caught by what he coined as "a bunch of bumbling idiots," the state intelligence agency.⁴⁴ He was found out because of too much trash in front of his girlfriend's house. The police and intelligence agents had staked out her house and thinking that there was only one person living there they noticed that the house was producing too much trash for one person. When they investigated the trash agents found medicine for psoriasis, which Guzman was to be inflicted with and his favorite cigarettes, Winston Lights.⁴⁵ With that the police raided the house and captured Guzman. The government paraded Guzman all over the television bringing a tremendous moral blow to Sendero movement. Now everyone could see that Abmiel Guzman was not a god and certainly infallible. His capture combined the repentance law with the proverbial final nail into the Senderos coffin. After Guzman's capture in 1992 there were over 600 Senderist in the region Cajabamba-Huamachuco region alone and over 300 of them had sought amnesty under the Repentance law.⁴⁶

The methods that the Peruvian government used to in their counter-insurgency should adhered to, for they are good examples of how to defeat an insurgency. If the United States is to defeat Al Qaeda, they going to have to defeat them politically, economically, and socially. The most important thing that the Peruvian government did was that after eight years it learned to adapt. Once it did it was able apply the eight principles of counter-insurgency⁴⁷. As these principles held true for the Peruvians they will hold true for the United States in its battle against Al Qaeda.

The first principle is that the legitimacy government should be the main objective. For Peru this meant that it had to maintain a stable and corruption free government. Second is that a counter-insurgency must have unity of effort, specifically unity of command over all elements of national power. When Fujimori came into power he was able to give purpose and direction in the counter-insurgency. Third, is that politics is primacy. Once it was realized that everything the government had to tie all its goals to political objectives, the government stopped making mistakes. Fourth is one must understand the environment. The government had to interact and understand what motivated the rural people of Peru. Fifth is that intelligence drives all operation, as demonstrated by the capture of Guzman. The sixth imperative is the necessity of isolating the insurgence from their cause. The creation of the CDCs and the repentance law worked extremely well to isolate the Sendero. Seven is states that security is the rule of law. The Peruvian military learned that they must secure the population and that the population must learn to protect themselves through the development of the CDCs. The eight and final imperative is to be prepared to make a long term commitment and the Peruvian government was ready, they were not going any where until they achieved victory.

Internal Failures of the Movement: Politically, Economically and Socially

Yes it is true that the government had learned counter-insurgency, which was significant in the defeat of Sendero. However, Sendero also failed internally, it can be argued that these failures played more of a significant role than the government's counter-insurgency. The Senderists were well organized, had an ideology based in Marxism that was followed like a religion by many. It had funding through illegal trade of cocoa and it a charismatic leader that was followed like a demi-god. There are several reasons why they failed. For the most part the Sendero failed for reasons that can be called internal failures. Despite some initial campaigns that were initially very successful progress eventually eroded away due to internal factors. Other reasons can be attributed to the fact that Peruvian government and military finally figured out how to effectively defeat the Guzman and his followers.

They failed politically in many regions of Peru. Sendero Luminoso simple failed to get inhabitants to cross the divide between passive and active involvement. Recruitment outside of Ayacucho became very difficult. For example in Cajabamba-Huamachuco region, local inhabitants were not convinced in the long-term viability of the Senderist revolution.⁴⁸ The people outside of Ayacucho heard stories of massacres both in part of the army and by the rebels, the people wanted to live as normal life as possible without antagonizing either side. Many of the males had also been previous conscripts and knew what the Army was capable of and they had more money, better equipment and that eventually the army would get their act together and put down the rebellion.

Sendero also failed to realize that outside of Ayacucho many of the compansinos were entrenched politically in their political parties. This would make it very difficult for the Sendero's prostylizing drive. An example of this is the Sendero's absolute refusal to recognize the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Revolutionary Popular Allaince-

APRA). The APRA was a nonviolent left-wing social democratic and Democratic Socialist political party, which was quickly becoming a viable alternative the harshness of the Sendero⁴⁹. The Sendero went to extremes when it came to APRA, so far as to assassinate high official in the party for remaining loyal to APRA. It was said, "the Sendero started hitting wrong targets." Many people did not believe that killing was the best catalyst for change⁵⁰. Rather change would come by putting pressure on the government to invest time and money into regions to improve living conditions. Not by blowing up fellow peasants. The Sendero also failed to adopt existing grass roots movements outside of Ayacucho. Especially, the Rondas Campesinas and peasant federations, the Sendero believe that the Rondas were comprised of reformist bourgeois entities. The bottom line for the Sendero Luminoso was that they were against all independent organization and political action by the peasantry. The Sendero simply believed that the fourth sword of Gonzalo thought was the only true way to achieve control of the country. They were unwilling to compromise out their ideology, for the Sendero, it was all or nothing.

They also failed economically, because the insurgency had a disruptive effect on the natural economies in Peru. Namely the Sendero started to threaten the production of family farms. As the rebellion progressed through time the Shining Path began to curtail market contacts of the peasantry and required to provide food to sustain Ejercito Guerrillero Popular (popular Guerilla Army-EGP) detachments.⁵¹ The EGPs were local support bases made of indigenous populations modeled after the Communist Party of China of the 1920s. Along with this the Sendero also began drafting the sons and daughter of the local population exercised a negative effect on the operations of a non-mechanized, labor-intensive farming system by removing much needed hands. Essentially the Sendero began stealing from the people. By doing so they were in violations of Mao's "The Three Rules and Eight Remarks," which laid

down the principles the govern guerrilla conduct towards civilian populations.⁵² The goal for the rebel army should have been to become one with the people, so that they see it as their one army. The Sendero Luminoso would not find a solution to the provisions conundrum, thus alienating the people from the rebellion. In some cases the Sendero enacted so much control over the people and their land, it was said that they were acting like a patron, a patron that they were clamming to have liberated the countryside from and now become what they hated. In other example, where the Sendero were successful with land reform and were not abusive; however, once the peasants had achieved their goals more pressing everyday concerns started to take priority of esoteric concepts such as the protracted people's war and the over throwing the land lord bureaucratic state.

They also failed socially. Sendero became active in the countryside through their strategy "*batir el campo*," which literal means to churn the countryside. They instigated a significant contraction in the services provisioned in the countryside.⁵³ This was done to undermine all government gains that had been made in many hamlets in the development of social service across the board in recent decades. In reality, Senderist activity would scare away civil servants such as schoolteachers, doctors and local branches of local ministries. Thus isolating local populations, children could no longer go to school and the sick could not receive treatment. This situation would only intensify in the Sendero's later phases after 1984 when Senderists began increasing violence against local population as a form of coercion against the peasantry in an attempt to maintain their foot holds in the country side. Very little gains were made through this violence as the local population became weary of Senderist motives. These acts of violence once again, emphasize the Sendero's loss of focus by not following Maoist thought and failure to use means that would maintain the hearts and mine with in their support

base. Surprisingly starting in 1985 and ending in 1997 Senderist violence against the peasants would steadily increase to extreme amounts of violence in the countryside.⁵⁴ Which would only lead to a self defeating cycle, as the Sendero began losing footholds in the provinces they would use more violence against populations, thus losing more and more strong holds. This combined with the government's development of policy to reduce human rights violations by the police and military would intensify the Sendero's increasingly tenuous situation.

Despite Guzman's famous "Speech from the Cage" in 1992, which was a message to his followers encouraging the continuation the People's Revolution after his capture the movement virtually seized to exist. The leadership that still remained after Guzman's capture sporadically carried on the movement until its inevitable disappearance in 1997. Although the government learned how to wage a successful counter insurgency, it was not the government that lost the fight. It was the Sendero alone that failed to maintain its focus and initiative in the early years of the revolution. Abmiel Guzman started his movement with an ideology that was deeply rooted the ideas of Carlos Jose Mariategui and Mao Tse-tung. Guzman envisioned Peru as social socialist communal state. He failed because failed to truly understand complexity of the native Peru and its diverse culture. Because of this Guzman failed to maintain a strictly Maoist revolution. He could not win the will of the people and as time past his followers were not the true believers that he had in 1980. Without their charismatic leader and what was in 1992 lacks luster ideology that had lost its true focus the revolution faded away.

As presented here the Sendero made many mistakes and over time these mistake eventually caught up with them. It is crucial that counter-insurgents pay strict attention to the enemy to exploit the mistakes they make to their full advantage. By the nature of Al Qaeda's ideology they have tendency to make many of the same mistakes as Sendero did. For example,

both believe that extreme ideologies will fortify the will of their believers. Therefore they intolerant of organizations that have similar cause, but yet different. The Sendero's relationship APRA is a good example of this. Today Al Qaeda routinely attacks Islamic sects that profess beliefs inconsistent with their religious dogma. Uncontrollable violence is another mistake that both movements share. Sendero's use violence against innocent people as a means of coercion was out of control. Violence against innocence can only be used in a limited capacity before it works against the insurgency as it did for Sendero. Al Qaeda has come to realize that its use of violence has become out of control and has issued statements to its followers to withhold form such violence. For example," We kill the captives by bullet. That would achieve that which is sought after without exposing ourselves to the question and answering to doubts. We don't need this."⁵⁵ As time passes like the counter-insurgent the insurgent will become frustrated and will make mistakes. It is crucial that the insurgent's blunders are exploited and turned against them.

How is the Sendero Relevant to AL Qaeda?

If we have learned one thing from the 20th Century, it is that a radical ideology is just that, a radical ideology whether it is motivated by religion or by communism. For the sake of accuracy it is important to note that Al Qaeda is not a religious movement, rather it is a political movement that uses Islam as a motivator. For Al Qaeda to be a true religious movement it requires its leadership to clearly state fundamental differences from Wahabism, which they have not done. It does not matter what the motivation is there will always be esoteric leaders and there will always be people that are willing to go to extremis and die for a cause whether it is right or wrong. If Al Qaeda is a movement with a global ambition then it certainly can be compared to the global communist movement. The reality is that both have more similarities then differences. For example both are elite driven, cellular, utopian in nature and as previously

stated have global desires for political change.⁵⁶ Therefore, it can be said that the Senderist Revolution was merely one battle in the fight for global communism and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan can simply be considered as two separate battles in the war for global radical Islam. If this is true, than Osama Bin Laden is the same to Al Qaeda as Guzman was to the Sendero Luminoso. Just, like Al Qaeda uses Islam to motivate its followers Guzman used the idea that communism is the natural state of man that is the only fundamental law.⁵⁷

The rhetoric of both movements are actually very similar; both write in an attempt to unit followers together against a common oppressor, the United States and imperialism of the Western World. Guzman takes it a step further and also state that the revolution is also against what he calls the revisionist Imperialists of the Soviet Union.⁵⁸ Many writings of both Guzman and Bin Laden bring praise to heroes and their cause to provide legitimacy to their revolution by emphasizing that there is a legacy that precedes them. The idea of the protracted war and of inevitable victory due western ineptitude is referred to in both pieces. History is used to emphasize that the West has humiliated their people for half a Millennium. Bin laden refers to historical places and characters "They (the West) did not know that the lions of Al Shara and Khiffan are in the field, carrying their souls on the palms of their hands. They are trained on patience and endurance."⁵⁹ He is symbolizing that this is a protracted war that has gone on for 500 years. For Guzman the protracted war is the single overarching piece to the Sendero Strategy. Guzman refers to this idea in Writings such as "The New Flag" were he states "We are in the final part of the 20th Century, very soon we will see the years go by and they will pass even faster as we advance towards the transformation of our society in the third millennium of humanity."⁶⁰ In Guzman's final statement to his followers he states, "We believe the 18th

century was a very clear lesson. Think about this. There was a dominator. It was Spain and where did that bloodsucking domination bring us.”⁶¹

Conclusion

So how does the United States defeat Al Qaeda? It defeats Al-Qaeda at the local level. Wherever an Al Qaeda cell pops up in the world it can be defeated at the local level politically, economically and socially. Each individual insurgency has their one unique trait. There is no cookie cutter solution to counter insurgency. However, examples such as the defeat of the Sendero Luminoso can be used to create a framework on how to conduct count-insurgencies in the future. Insurgencies are protracted wars and many use this idea as their keystone for their ideology. It should be remembered that this idea could be used against them. As the prolonged war continued, Sendero lost its focus, forgets its roots and became impatient with the protracted war, they made many mistakes and they were defeated. In conclusion, the United States should remember that it is the side that provides a better life for the people the world. It is the side that wins the hearts and minds that will prevail against Al Qaeda.

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